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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE - RIGHT
TO EFFECTIVE AssisTANCE OF CouNsEL - Robbery of a Federal Reserve Bank
and jeopardizing lives by the use of dangerous weapons were the charges brought
against defendant in a federal district court. Ten months after being taken into
custody, he was finally brought to trial.1 On the latter date, for the first time, the
defendant expressed to the court a desire to engage different counsel because of
recent difficulties he had had with his original choice. The defendant was the
complaining petitioner in a pending disbarment proceeding against his attorney.
But the record did not show that the defendant disclosed the nature of those
differences to the trial court, nor that the judge made any effort to ascertain
what they were. The court refused the request, even though the attorney offered
to withdraw. Conviction was followed by the imposition of a thirty-five year
sentence. Defendant appealed from an order of the district court denying his
unverified petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Held, defendant was not denied
the constitutional right to assistance of counsel. 2 McDonald v. Hudspeth, (C. C.
A. I oth, I 940) I I 3 F. ( 2d) 984, certiorari denied (U. S. I 940) 6 I S. Ct. 64.
A defendanes request to be allowed to change counsel includes, by necessary
implication, a request for a continuance in order that the new attorney be al-

1 Several factors contributed to the long delay, chief among which were that
judges were on vacations and that the trial of an important S. E. C. case extended over
several months.
2 ·The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States specifically
guarantees the right to assistance of counsel in federal criminal cases. To what extent
a formal compliance with that guarantee will be held sufficient is the concern of this
note. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution has been held to be a guarantee
of this right in state criminal cases. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 at 66-68, 53 S.
Ct. 55 (1932).
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lowed time to familiarize h}mself with the facts and prepare for trial. 8 The granting of a continuance is universally held to be a matter resting in the discretion 4
of the trial court, and its ruling will not be disturbed unless there is a manifest
abuse of that discretion. 9 There is no abuse of discretion when a continuance is
refused where due diligence was not used in securing new counsel,° or where it
is not shown that the party is free from fault in the matter. 7 In cases on direct
appeal the reviewing court confines its decision to the facts as presented on the
record, but on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus the court does not ordinarily
so restrict itself. 8 Though the principal case arose on habeas corpus proceedings,
yet the court denied that the defendant was entitled to a continuance, because
the record did not affirmatively show that he was free from fault in not obtaining new counsel. To rest a constitutional right on this technical basis seems
precarious. A defendant, unlearned in the law and without counsel, cannot be
expected to know what he has to present to the court. Assuming that the facts,
properly put into the record, would be sufficient to entitle the defendant to a
continuance,9 the view seems narrow which forces him to gamble most of the
3 That the trial court treated the request in this wise is clear, for the refusal of the
court was based on the delay which would ensue, were the request substantially granted.
Mere formal permission to hire a new attorney was neither what the defendant wanted,
nor what the trial court assumed he wanted. Daugherty v. State, 33 Tex. Cr. 173, 26
S. W. 60 (1894) (where defendant's counsel became ill the night before trial, held,
continuance should have been granted); Kuehn v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. 636, 85 S. W.
793 (1905) (where, until 4 days before trial, defendant had had reason to believe that
his case would be continued until the next term, and then, in ensuing 4 days, was not
able to get a criminal lawyer, held, continuance 'should have been granted).
4 Avery v. Alabama, 308 U. S. 444, 60 S. Ct. 321 (1940); Leija v. Concha,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1931) 39 S. W. (2d) 948. For voluminous citation of authority, see
17 C. J. S. 191 (1939) and ANN. CAs. 1913C 431 at 437-440.
5 In the following cases, the court abused its discretion in refusing a continuance:
Cox v. Spears, 181 Ky. 363, 206 S. W. 20 (1918) (counsel had abandoned the practice of law, unbeknown to his client, an old, illiterate woman); People v. Blumenfeld,
330 Ill. 474, 161 N. E. 857 (1928) (attorney was busy in another city with another
case); Farmers' Gas Co. v. Calame, (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) 262 S. W. 546 (counsel
was absent because of conflicting engagements, and time did not permit another to be
secured who was acquainted with the facts and the law).
But no abuse of discretion was found in the following cases: Wilson v. Lanagan,
(C. C. A. 1st, 1938) 99 F. (2d) 544 (arraignment on Friday was followed by trial
on Monday, with no continuance granted); Cannady v. State, (Ga. 1940) 9 S. E.
(2d). 241 (24 hours held sufficient time to prepare for trial).
6 Sager v. Moltz, So Ind. App. 122, 139 N. E. 687 (1923) (no showing that the
client had tried to keep counsel from withdrawing, or to get new counsel); Eberhart
v. Murphy, IIO Wash. 158, 188 P. IJ (1920) (attorney withdrew from the case
one month before trial, giving client ample time to secure new counsel, which was not
done).
7 Sandlin v. Pharoah, 182 Okla. 442, 78 P. (2d) 284 (1938) (unpaid attorney gave 3 weeks' notice that if he were not paid, he would not defend, and client
came to trial without having paid or secured another lawyer).
8 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86, 43 S. Ct. 265 (1923).
9 It does not appear how long before trial the defendant was at odds with his
attorney, nor how much time he had had to engage a new one. Conceivably, it all
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remainder of his natural life with only an enemy as his defender,1° because he
failed to give the trial judge a formal account of the situation existing between
his attorney and himself. The judge, on his part, must use discretion in refusing
a continuance, but it is hard to see how this discretion can be other than arbitrary,
when the necessary facts on which alone a fair decision can be reached are not
known to him. The argument sometimes made against granting a continuance,
to the effect that fraud and collusion between attorney and client would thereby
be encouraged and trials unduly delayed, is not insurmountable. The facts of
each case, if inspected by the trial court, would shortly reveal the true situation.11
The court in. the principal case justifies the action of the trial court in refusing
the continuance on the ground of the public interest against further delay.12
Yet the court makes no mention of any public interest in the ten-month period
during which defendant had to wait before he ever came to trial. Surely, when
last minute circumstances alter the complexion of the attorney-client relationship
to the extent that occurred in the principal case, the public interest ought not
be so begrudging as to deprive defendant of a scant week's time, especially when
it will amount to a bare fraction of the time he has already waited.
T,Valter Muller

happened so closely upon the eve of trial that the time to take proper steps was insufficient. This would have been made clear had the trial judge inquired into the matter.
10 To force the accused to trial with such an attorney as his legal representative is to
make the lawyer-client relationship a mockery. The case most similar to the principal
one, so far as relations between the attorney and client are concerned, was one in which
the lawyer-appointee of the court declined the duty because of his enmity towards the
defendant, but the court insisted that he defend the accused, on the theory that he
could divorce his feelings from his duty. Although the record showed that the attorney
conscientiously performed his duty, held, the defendant was denied the assistance of
counsel. "The right, given •.• to every person accused of crime, 'to have the assistance
of counsel,' in defending himself, is not afforded by the judge's appointing, to defend
the accused, an attorney who protests that he is so prejudiced against the party accused
that he cannot properly defend him." State v. Jones, 174 La. 1074 at 1078, 142 So.
693 (1932). The court wisely refrained from weighing the intangible factors which go
to determine whether or not the appointment has been prejudicial in fact. But for a
case where the court undertook to see whether there had been prejudicial error, and
found there was none, see Fuller v. State, 117 Tex. Cr. 558, 37 S. W. (2d) 156
(1931).
11 But see Henck v. Todhunter, 7 Har. & J. (Md.) 275 (1826), for the leading
case in setting out the fraud argument against granting a continuance.
12 In Chenault v. Commonwealth, 282 Ky. 453, 138 S. W. (2d) 969 (1940),
the court pointed out that the peace and order of society require both an early trial and
a reasonable time and opportunity to prepare and present a defense, but that it is more
important that the trial should be fair than that it should be speedy.

